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Effectiveness of Two Water Conservation
Policies: An Integrated Modeling Approach
Biswa R. Das, David B. Willis, and Jeffrey Johnson
Agriculture in the Texas High Plains depends entirely on the Ogallala Aquifer. Texas enacted
water conservation legislation to address declining reserves in the aquifer. We developed an
integrated regional water policy model that links a hydrology model with an economic op-
timization model to estimate policy impacts with respect to economic cost and water con-
servation. Testing the effectiveness of two policies, a groundwater extraction tax and
extraction quotas, we observe that neither significantly inhibits groundwater use. Although
both policies conserve similar amounts of groundwater, the regional cost of the tax policy to
agriculture is more than the quota policy.
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Agriculture in the Texas High Plains (THP)
depends entirely on the availability of ground-
water in the Southern Ogallala
1 Aquifer (High
Plains Underground Water Conservation District,
2004). Beginning in the 1940s and until the late
1970s, agricultural producers took advantage of
Texas groundwater law, commonly referred to as
the ‘‘right of capture,’’ which granted landowners
a complete property right to all groundwater re-
serves beneath a landowner’s land (Kaiser and
Skillern, 2001). A falling water table, which in-
creased pump lifts, and the high energy prices in
the late 1970s gradually reduced groundwater
withdrawals and irrigated acreage. In 2002, 3.5
million THP crop acres were irrigated, approxi-
mately 55% less than the 8.1 million acres irri-
gated in the late 1960s (Texas Senate Bill 2,
Austin, TX, 2002).
Texas legislation, specifically Senate Bills 1
(Texas Senate Bill 1, Austin, TX, 1997) and 2
(TexasSenateBill2,Austin,TX,2002),explicitly
recognized the growing scarcity of groundwa-
ter supplies. Senate Bill 1 (SB 1) fundamentally
changed the structure of water management in the
state by modifying several sections of the Texas
Water Code. It required the Texas Water Devel-
opment Board (TWDB) to develop a comprehen-
sive statewide water use plan that incorporated
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1Comprises the southern third of the Ogallala
Aquifer system, which altogether stretches across
eight states, encompassing a land area of approxi-
mately 10,000 square miles.
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 2010 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationlocally developed regional water plans (Article 1,
Section 1.01). Senate Bill 2 (SB 2) established the
Texas Water Advisory Council as well as guide-
lines to improve management planning of surface
water and groundwater at the local, regional, and
state levels (Texas Joint Committee on Water
Resources, 2002). SB 2 also increased the au-
thority of groundwater districts to regulate the
use of groundwater within their jurisdiction,
allowingthemtoimposeproductionfeestolimit
groundwater withdrawals. These fees could not
exceed $1 per acre-foot of water withdrawn.
Both bills were collectively designed to transi-
tion Texas groundwater management from the
ruleofcapturetoa‘‘statutory-basedgroundwater
management system administered by local dis-
tricts that are tailored to meet the needs of spe-
cific aquifers’’ (House Research Organization,
2000, p. 8).
Several authors have studied the economics
of groundwater use in the THP (Arabiyat,
1998; Das, 2004; Feng, 1992; Johnson, 2003;
Nieswiadomy, 1985; Terrell, 1998; Wheeler,
2008). Although these studies accounted for the
spatial differences in cropping patterns, crop
yields, water use, and water supplies between
counties, they modeled the Southern Ogallala
Aquifer as a homogenous resource at the county





4 and water table
5 elevation vary from
one locale to another within each county, aver-
age county hydrologic conditions are likely not
representative of all areas within a county. Simi-
larly, water use isalso not similar across all regions
within a county. Thus, using average conditions
and homogeneous water use could either over- or
underestimate policy cost, economic returns, and
quantity of groundwater conserved estimates
under policies that change the economic in-
centive to withdraw groundwater. For example,
in Gaines County, one of the 19 counties in the
study, the per-acre annual return in Year 50 was
$65.2 and $31.5 under the normative economic
and integrated models, respectively (Das, 2004).
Similarly, total annual water use in Year 50 was
226 thousand acre-feet and 83 thousand acre-
feet under the economic and integrated models,
respectively (Das, 2004).
Appreciating the need to account for such
spatial variation is water use, Willis and Whittlesey
(1998) developed a two-stage modeling pro-
cedure to analyze a variety of hydrologically
viable streamflow augmentation policies in the
Walla WallaRiverBasin situated in southeastern
Washington and northwestern Oregon. The first-
stage economic submodel determined optimal
on-farm response to a specific instream flow
policy. The second-stage hydrology model used
the optimal water use pattern as determined by
the economic model to monitor policy effects
on monthly streamflow levels and groundwater
levels. Stovall (2001) developed a groundwater
hydrology model forthe THP counties bylaying
a grid that consisted of 1-square mile cells over
the Ogallala Aquifer in the THP. He simulated
the impact on the aquifer water volume over
time as a result of groundwater withdrawals,
primarily for agriculture. Although the model
had accurate hydrologic data, the groundwater
withdrawal that he imposed did not take into
account the agricultural producer behavior with
respect to water use over time by accounting for
the various costs and returns associated and
constrained by the amount of water available
and the depth from which water was pumped.
There have been several studies conducted
in the state of Texas that focused on alternate
types of policies to conserve groundwater.
Guerroro, Amosson, and Almas (2008) pointed
out the involvementofstakeholdersinall phases
oftheprojectprocessascritical,especiallywhen
dealing with controversial issues such as water
conservation strategies/policies. According to
them, this ensures that the appropriate conser-
vation strategies are being evaluated and that
realistic implementation schedules are being
2A lowering of water table of an unconfined
aquifer or the potentiometric surface of a confined
aquifer caused by pumping of groundwater from wells.
3The rate at which water flows into the aquifer
mainly from precipitation, melting of snow, irrigation
runoff, and other domestic and commercial water use
runoff.
4The difference between the base of the aquifer
and the water table elevation.
5The surface of an aquifer at which the pore water
pressure is atmospheric. It can be measured by in-
stalling shallow wells extending a few feet into the
zone of saturation and then measuring the water level
in those wells.
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public acceptance of project results. Using in-
formation from stakeholders will aid an in-
tegrated approach in estimating realistic policy
cost and water conserved.
Wheeler et al. (2008) use a short-term and
long-term water buy-out policy to estimate the
economic impact on production agriculture in
the THP. Although the long-term buy-out per-
manently converts irrigated acreage into dryland,
the short-term approach allows returning back
to irrigation after a 15-year gap. Based on the
findings in one of the representative counties,
the short-term cost of saving a foot of saturated
thickness was $190 and the long-term cost was
$122. As we observe in the findings, these policy
costs are significantly higher than either the
quota or tax policy considered in our study. More
so, it is highly unlikely that producers will switch
to a nonirrigated farming knowing very well it is
in their economic interest to use the groundwater
beneath their farmland.
Keplinger et al. (1998) examined a dry year
irrigation suspension as a way of reallocating
water when aquifer levels are low for the Texas
Edwards Aquifer. In such a scenario, farmers
would be paid to suspend irrigation to allow
more spring flow or nonagricultural pumping.
Their findings suggest that most acreage par-
ticipates when a $90 per-acre payment is offered
before the cropping season. However, consid-
erably higher payments are needed and less
water saved for a suspension program instituted
during the cropping season.
In this study, we develop an integrated re-
gional water policy model of production ag-
riculture for the THP by linking a dynamic
economic optimization model to a detailed
hydrology model of the southern portion of
Ogallala Aquifer beneath the THP. The 19 shaded
counties in Figure 1 that overlay the southern
portion of the Ogallala Aquifer account for over
90% of the total groundwater withdrawals from
theOgallalaAquifer inthe THP (TWDB, 2005).
The integrated model was used to study the
impact of two water conservation policies, a
tax and a quota policy, and alternate crop price
scenarios on agricultural water use that are de-
scribed in Table 1. The regional differences
are demonstrated by comparing countywise
economic returns and water use. The conser-
vation policy cost, quantity of water conserved,
and cost per acre-foot of water conserved by
a county and the region under the tax and quota
policies allow us to determine the effectiveness
of the two policies.
Data and Model Specification
Conceptually, the integrated model consists of
three linked submodels. Figure 2 illustrates the
data flow among and linking of the three sub-
models.The following sectiondiscussesthedata
requirements and each of the three submodels
independently and explains how they are linked
together.
Dynamic Economic Optimization Submodel
The first-stage economic model used in this
study is a dynamic nonlinear model of pro-
duction agriculture for each of the 19 individual
Figure 1. Nineteen-County Study Region in
the Texas High Plains (Source: Johnson, 2003,
p. 91; Note: The map represents the state of
Texas and its counties. The shaded counties in
west Texas are among the counties that overlay
the southern portion of the Ogallala Aquifer.
These 19 counties account for over 90% of the
total groundwater withdrawals from the Ogallala
Aquifer in the Texas High Plains)
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counties collectively account for approximately
93% of all Texas groundwater withdrawals from
the Southern Ogallala Aquifer (TWDB, 2005)
and include Bailey, Briscoe, Castro, Cochran,
Crosby, Dawson, Deaf Smith, Floyd, Gaines,
Garza, Hale, Hockley, Lamb, Lubbock, Lynn,
Parmer, Swisher, Terry, and Yoakum. Further-
more, almost 95% of these withdrawals are for
irrigated agriculture with very little municipal
use because of water quality considerations in the
region (Das, 2004). There is very little industrial
use and residential water use in the region is
sourced from Lake Meredith. Each county-level
model was designed to derive the optimal time
path for groundwater extraction that maximized
the net present value of agricultural returns (for
cotton, sorghum, corn, wheat, and peanuts) over
a 50-year planning horizon in each county.
The objective function of the optimization
model maximized the net present value of annual
net returns to land, management, groundwater








where c represents the crop grown, i represents
the either irrigated or nonirrigated,
6 and t rep-
resents the time period. Qcit represents the per-
centageofcrop cproducedbyirrigationsystemi
in period t, Pc represents the price of crop c, Ycit
represents the yield per acre of crop c produced
by irrigation system i in period t, Cit represents
the cost of production per acre of crop c pro-
duced by irrigation system i in period t, WPcit
represents the acre-feet of water applied per acre
to crop c produced by irrigation type i in period
t, Lt represents the pump lift infeet in time t,a n d
NIt represents the net income in time t.Y i e l d
Table 1. Policy Scenarios Examined in the Study Using the Integrated Model
Scenario Description
Baseline The baseline scenario simulates agricultural crop response and groundwater
use over the 50-year planning horizon assuming optimal producer response
to increasing water scarcity over time given current water policy regulations,
private economic incentives, and irrigation technology
$1 tax Represents the impact of imposing a $1 tax per acre-foot of groundwater
extracted from the Ogallala Aquifer on cropping patterns, groundwater use,
and the volume of groundwater stored in the aquifer in Year 50 of the
planning period
Policy tax Represents the tax required to conserve at least 50% of the stored
groundwater volume in Year 50 of the planning period beginning with
the base year of 2004
Quota Represents the economic and hydrologic impact of instituting a quota policy
designed to assure that at least 50% of initial county reserves are available
in each county at the end of the 50-year planning horizon
Average crop prices Simulates the expected impact on regional economic returns and groundwater
use if agricultural crop prices increased to their historic 20-year average
prices measured in 2003 dollars
Average crop prices
with policy tax
Simulates the effectiveness of the county-specific policy tax developed under
the baseline situation assuming crop prices are at their 20-year real
average values
High cotton price The prices of all crops except cotton are returned to their baseline level and
cotton price is raised from its baseline value of $0.57 to $0.70 per pound
High cotton price
with policy tax
The effectiveness of the policy tax established in the baseline simulation is
examined to determine its effect of groundwater conservation under a high
cotton price scenario.
6In the rest of the article, we use either irrigated or
nonirrigated as the two types of irrigation.
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tions derived from the Crop Production and
Management Model (CROPMAN) model.
To develop the production functions using
CROPMAN Software (2003) describing crop
yield response to applied irrigation water, the
following data were used. The variable costs for
dryland crop production and the additional costs
for irrigation were obtained from crop enterprise
budgets developed by the Texas Agricultural
Extension Service for Texas Extension District
2 that are included in the Appendix. A low-
pressure center pivot irrigation system was used
as the representative irrigation system based on
information that this technology was the most
widely used within the study region (Texas Ag-
ricultural Experiment Station, 2003). A brief
explanation of how CROPMAN works is pro-
vided in the Appendix. Like with every sector
that consumes energy, there is a good possi-
bility that energy prices may increase and
technological advancements will increase effi-
ciency of irrigation systems and pump/engine.
The costs to irrigated agriculture will change
based on how much the price increases are
compensated by increase in engine and irriga-
tion efficiency. Clearly, the assumptions of only
one type of irrigation technology as well as no
changes in fertilizer application rates between
dryland and irrigated could have impacts on the
profitability of the overall enterprise.
We used one equation of motion to monitor
pump-lift, which allows the model to capture
the impact of agricultural water use on aquifer
Figure 2. Model Linkages and Data Flow within the Integrated Economic Model
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cultural returns over the 50-year planning horizon
considered. The relationship between manage-
ment choices (crops irrigated and quantity of water
applied per acre) made at time t and the value of
the two variables (pumping lift and remaining
groundwater stock) at time t11i sc a p t u r e du s i n g
this recursive equation. Assuming that a hydro-
logic region (the county) is homogeneous, the
equation of motion for pump lift at time t for
a representative acre is specified as:
(2) Lt11 5 Lt 11=SY* Wt   RCHt ðÞ =12 ½  ,
where L t11 is the pump-lift in feet at time t11,
and Lt the pump lift in time period t. The pa-
rameter SY is specific yield, the percentage of
aquifer volume available for pumping. In the
economic submodel, the SY value assigned to
each study region county was 0.15, the average
value for the Southern Ogallala Aquifer. The
variable Wt represents average groundwater
withdrawals per irrigated acre in each county
measured in ac-in/ac for all irrigated crops, and
RCHt is aquifer recharge in ac-in per acre to the
aquiferfrom allsources,includinggroundwater
return flow. The 12 in the denominator con-
verted inches to feet. It must be noted here that
because the lateral flow of water is a slow pro-
cess, the possibility for rapid withdrawal in one
regionincreasingthepumpliftordecreasingthe
saturated thickness in a neighboring region, al-
though possible, is not very probable in a short
timeframe. The rate of groundwater flow is
impacted by the viscosity of the water, the po-
rosityofthesoil,andthegradient(Fetter,2001).
The objective function was maximized for
a 50-year planning horizon and expressed as:





where NPVR is the net present value of net
incomeandrrepresentsthesocialdiscountrate.
The findings are extremely sensitive to the dis-
countrate.Usingamuchgreaterratewillleadto
more counties using up the groundwater in the
present time period. A positive discount rate
would imply that water is more valuable in the
present than in the future. Using a negative
discount ratewould mean that water has greater
value in the future than in the present time. For
the purposes of this study, a discount rate of 3%
is used. A brief explanation of why we choose
a3%ispresentedintheAppendix.Thedynamic













The objective function in Equation (4) was
obtained by substituting Equation (1) into
Equation (3).
Equations (5), (6), and (7) express the re-
lationship between the amount of water used
and the amount of water available. Equation (5)
expresses the amount of water available to be
pumped as gross pumping capacity (GPCt)i n
period t, where STt represents the saturated
thickness in time t, IST is the initial saturated
thickness, WY is the average initial well yield
for the county expressed in gallons per minute,
AW is the average number of wells per irrigated
acre of the county, and 4.42 acre-inches per
gallon per minute is a factor developed from the
assumption of 2000 pumping hours in a growing
season. Equation (6) expresses the total amount
of water pumped per acre (WTt) as the sum of
water pumped on each crop. Equation (7) is the
constraint requiring the amount of water pum-
ped (WTt) to be less than or equal to the amount
of water available for pumping (GPCt).








(7) WTt £ GPCt,
Equation (8) expresses the cost of pumping
(PCcit) for crop c produced by irrigation system
i in period t, where EF represents the energy use
factor for electricity, PSI represents the energy
use factor for electricity, PSI represents the ir-
rigation system operating pressure, EP repre-
sents energy price for electricity, EFF represents
pump engine efficiency, and the factor 2.31 feet
is the height of a column of water that will exert
a pressure of 1 pound per square inch. Equation
(9) expresses the cost of production (Ccit)f o r
crop c produced by irrigation type i in period t,
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acre, HCcit is the harvest cost per acre, MCi is
the maintenance cost per acre for the single type
irrigation system, DPi is the depreciation cost
per acre for the irrigation system, and LCi is the
irrigation labor cost per acre for irrigation.
(8) PCcit 5 f½EFðLt 12:31*PSIÞEP =EFFg*WPcit
(9)
Ccit 5 VCci 1PCcit 1HCcit 1MCi
1DPi 1LCi,
Equation (10) limits the share of acres for all
crops c produced by irrigation type i for each
period t to be less than or equal to 1. Equation
(11)limitstheannualshiftfromanycropto90%
of the previous year’s acreage. This limit on the
rate of transition between crop enterprises at-
tempts to control the rate at which the model
switches from one enterprise to another to rep-
licate an orderly transition between crop enter-
prises. Equation (12) ensures that the values of






Qci £ 1 for all t
(11) Qcit ³ 0:9Qcit 1 and
(12) Qcit ³ 0
To estimate theimpact oneconomic returns and
water use of the two tax policies, $1 tax policy,
and the policy tax required to achieve at least
50% aquifer storage at the end of the 50-year
planningperiod,thetaxrateswereintroducedin
the cost equation (Equation [9]) where the tax
rate (either $1 or the policy tax) expressed in
dollarsperac-ft/acwasmultipliedbytheamount
of water used in ac-ft/ac. Similarly, to estimate
the impact of the quota policy, the quota rate of
50%wasintroducedasaconstraintthatrestricted
the saturated thickness at 50% of the initial sat-
urated thickness at the end of the 50-year plan-
ning period in each county.
Hydrologic Submodel
Stovall’s (2001) hydrology model calibrated
for the Southern Ogallala Aquifer was used to
model aquifer status. MODFLOW, a widely used
computer software program designed to simulate
groundwater impacts caused by hydrologic
stresses, was used to observe changes in water
table elevation and the volume of water storage
in each of the cells in the grid (McDonald and
Harbaugh, 1988). The entire study region was
divided into a grid of 1-square mile cells that
were overlaid on the study region counties. These
cells were the unit of analysis and county aquifer
groundwater storage estimates over the 50-year
planning horizon were calculated by aggregating
the values corresponding to the county-specific
cells. Based on the initial water head, the water
use, recharge, saturated thickness, hydraulic con-
ductivity, and other physical characteristics of the
aquifer in that cell, the 1-square mile cells either
continue to be operational or dry up over time.
Once a cell is dry, it remains so for the rest of the
simulation years.
The annual county-level time-series of op-
timal groundwater withdrawals generated by the
first-stage economic model for the 50-year plan-
ning horizon for each of the 19 study area counties
was directly written into an Excel spreadsheet
(Microsoft, Redmond, WA) using the GAMS data
export commands. The annual water use data for
each county was subsequently spatially distrib-
uted over the land area in each county for each
simulated year. The weighting scheme was de-
veloped using detailed irrigation survey maps
provided by High Plains Underground Water
Conservation District #1 and the South Plains
Underground Water Conservation District that
inventoried the location of each center pivot
irrigation system in use in 1999 (Stovall, 2001).
A detailed explanation of theweighting scheme
is provided in the Appendix. Groundwater Vistas
Version 3 (ESRI, 2001), a Windows-based graphic
interface computer program, which can access
MODFLOW, was used to execute each policy
simulation for the spatially distributed ground-
water stresses predicted by the normative eco-
nomic model. The resulting output was exported
as shape files, which were accessed using
ARCGIS software (Environmental Systems Re-
search Institute, 2003) to estimate the volume of
water in each grid cell that still had water and
eliminate those cells that went dry over time. A
brief explanation on how the hydrology model
iteratively simulated water heads level in each
cell is included in the footnotes.
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The structure of the third-stage economic simu-
lation submodel was similar to the first-stage
normative economic submodel with two major
differences. First, the equation of motion was
deleted in the economic simulation model. Sec-
ond,the county estimatesofannual groundwater
withdrawals and the average pump-lift derived
from the hydrology simulation were imported
intotheeconomicsimulationmodelasparameter
values instead of variables.
It is significant to mention here that the study
assumes that all wells within a county were
equally productive in the initial year of the opti-
mization procedure. Under identical hydrologic
conditions, each irrigation system was assumed to
have the same efficiency and pumping capacity at
a point in time. Although a necessary assumption,
it limits the analysis to a degree given that center
pivot systems within a county have varying levels
of efficiency.
Policy Scenarios Examined
Table 1 illustrates all the scenarios that were
evaluated in this study. We estimate the cost-ef-
fectivenessofusingeitherproductionquotasand/
or fees (taxes) designed to influence economic
behavior of agricultural producers to preserve
50% of the currenttotal capacity ofgroundwater
overa50-yearplanninghorizon.Maintenanceof
50% of the initial groundwater reserve levels is
a management policy being considered by both
Panhandle Groundwater Conservation District
and High Plains Underground Water Conserva-
tion District, the two largest groundwater man-
agement districts in the THP. We also examine
the impact that changes in major crop prices,
including cotton, wheat, sorghum, corn, and
peanuts,haveongroundwaterusageintheTHP.
Overall the study examines seven scenarios
excludingthebaseline:$1tax,policytax,quota,
average crop price, average crop price with
policy tax, high cotton price, and high cotton
price under policy tax.
Besides the tax and quota policies examined
to ensure 50% aquifer storage at the end of the
50-year planning horizon, the study considered
two price scenarios that involved two variants
of a crop price increase. In the first price in-
crease scenario, crop prices were set at their
real 20-year average prices. The calculated real
per unit prices for cotton, corn, sorghum, pea-
nuts, and wheat used were $0.62, $2.77, $0.04,
$0.28, and $3.33, respectively (Texas Agricul-
tural Statistics Service, 2002). Under the sec-
ond price scenario, all crop prices except cotton
were returned to their original lower baseline
values, but cotton price was set at $0.7 per
pound. In real terms, a $0.7 per pound lint price
hasonlybeenexceededtwiceinthelast20years
in 1984 and 1995 (Texas Agricultural Statistics
Service, 2002), but given the importance of cot-
ton production to the THP, this scenario was
designed to establish the likely maximum agri-
cultural use ofgroundwater within the THP over
the next 50 years.
Findings
Imposition of a tax of $1/ac-ft water use re-
duced the 50-year per-acre net present value
return in each county relative to the baseline.
As shown in Table 2, the decrease ranged from
a low of $4 in Dawson County to a high of $25 in
Hale County. Overall, at the regional level, the $1
use tax, reduced the 50-year per acre net present
value return stream by $14, or approximately 1%
per acre. Regionally, groundwater use was re-
duced by only 0.5% relative to baseline use over
the 50-year planning horizon. Moreover, despite
the imposition of the $1 use tax, four counties
(Briscoe, Deaf Smith, Gaines, and Swisher,
marked with asterisk in Tables 2–5) had less
than 50% of their initial groundwater reserves in
storage at the end of the simulation period.
Overall, the hydrologic impact of the $1 use tax
was not significantly different from the baseline
scenario.
For the four counties whose ending reserve
levels were less than 50% of their initial level, the
tax rate per acre-foot was increased to the point
where at least 50% of initial reserves remained in
storage at the end of the simulation. The tax rate
was derived by iterating the integrated model
repeatedly until we found an alternative tax rate
that conserved at least 50% (rounded to nearest
decimals) of initial year groundwater reserves.
This tax was labeled as a policy tax.
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for the four counties ranged from a low of $9
in Deaf Smith to a high of $77 in Briscoe. In
Gaines and Swisher, the tax was $63 and $45,
respectively. The tax rates varied depending on
the value of crops grown, available groundwa-
ter supplies, crop substitution options, and the
area under irrigated acreage. Although the per-
acre net present value return was identical to
the prior $1 per acre-foot tax scenario for the
15 counties, they were much lower for the four
counties that levied the higher tax primarily as
a result of the magnitude of the policy tax re-
quired to achieve the 50% conservation goal.
Regionally, groundwater use declined by ap-
proximately 6% under this scenario.
Ironically, the percentage share of county
cropland under irrigation at the end of the plan-
ninghorizonwasslightlylargerthantheirending
share under the baseline for three of the four
counties confronted with a tax in excess of $1/
ac-ft. This occurred despite the fact that these
counties used less groundwater overall than they
did under the baseline scenario. This phenome-
non occurred because groundwater reserves are
subject to reserve dependent costs, that is, mar-
ginal extraction cost increases as reserves are
diminished. Moreover, groundwater reserves are
also subject to a stock effect in the sense that
rechargeaugmentsstorageovertime.Thus,when
use is restricted, the optimization model finds it
more profitable to use a greater share of allowed
groundwater use at the end of the planning ho-
rizon because the in situ value of the reserves is
growing more rapidly than the rate of discount.
The in situ value increases because the scarce
groundwater supplies are reserved for more valu-
able future uses and this initial conservation
reduces the cost of extracting future reserves
because pump lifts are not as deep.
A 50% quota on ending water reserves was
not restrictive in the 15 counties that had re-
serves in excess of 50% of their initial
groundwater reserves at the end of the baseline

















Bailey 0.00 –19.86 –19.86 0.00 482.76 463.65 1030.32 1010.07
Briscoe* 0.00 –14.76 –855.38 –489.09 394.84 –569.55 678.92 –366.71
Castro 0.00 –19.04 –19.04 0.00 498.94 479.78 1023.96 1005.34
Cochran 0.00 –10.84 –10.84 0.00 307.37 296.63 504.64 494.25
Crosby 0.00 –17.60 –17.60 0.00 624.27 606.48 1385.10 1367.21
Dawson 0.00 –4.12 –4.12 0.00 168.00 163.75 266.39 262.23
Deaf Smith* 0.00 –20.37 –174.91 –8.70 479.43 308.87 999.87 835.85
Floyd 0.00 –21.63 –21.63 0.00 669.73 648.60 1484.78 1463.77
Gaines* 0.00 –16.84 –1045.80 –22.73 284.80 –757.35 148.67 –926.26
Garza 0.00 –6.88 –6.88 0.00 314.75 307.93 611.74 604.35
Hale 0.00 –25.36 –25.36 0.00 762.40 736.93 1719.80 1695.30
Hockley 0.00 –9.87 –9.87 0.00 304.23 294.37 584.17 575.04
Lamb 0.00 –21.62 –21.62 0.00 723.15 701.51 1609.17 1588.15
Lubbock 0.00 –13.23 –13.23 0.00 404.73 391.88 857.97 844.59
Lynn 0.00 –5.88 –5.88 0.00 292.92 286.11 505.48 499.11
Parmer 0.00 –4.80 –4.80 0.00 469.17 450.03 1074.74 1056.20
Swisher* 0.00 –7.51 –338.36 –80.13 290.67 –46.88 492.16 163.07
Terry 0.00 –8.99 –8.99 0.00 277.37 268.53 338.37 329.68
Yoakum 0.00 –13.13 –13.13 0.00 431.12 418.82 599.27 587.39
Regional 0.00 –13.81 –137.75 –31.61 430.56 286.85 837.66 688.88
Note: In Tables 2–4, an asterisk after a county name identifies counties with less than 50% of their initial groundwater storage
volume at the end of the 50-year simulation under baseline conditions (Year 2004). In those counties, the optimal groundwater
tax is defined as the tax required to conserve 50% of initial county groundwater reserves under the baseline condition when a
$1 tax level was insufficient; in all other counties, the tax was set at the legal maximum of $1 per acre-foot.
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of these 15 counties, per-acre net present value
over the 50-year planning horizon and ground-
water use was identical to their respective
baseline level. Therefore, a quota policy did not
impact the decision-making of agricultural pro-
ducers in these counties. However, the 50-year
returnswerelowerinthefourcountieswherethe
water use constraint was binding. The lower
economic return level reflects the policy induced
groundwater scarcity in each of these four
counties. Regionally, groundwater use declined
by approximately 5% under a quota policy. De-
spite the lower economic return, producers in
these counties were much better off than they
were under both the $1 tax and policy tax sce-
narios.Fromaregionalperspective,acrossall19
counties, the conservation tax policy reduced the
presentvalueofnetincomeby12%,whereasthe
quota policy reduced the present value by only
1.3% relative to the baseline condition as shown
in Table 3.
The average crop price scenario simulated
the expected impact on regional economic
returns and groundwater use if agricultural crop
prices increased to their 20-year average prices
measured in 2003 dollars. As shown in Table 3,
regionally, per-acre net present value increased
by 39% relative to the baseline. For individual
THP counties, the increase ranged from a low
of 14% in Gaines to a high of 107% in Dawson.
As expected, irrigated groundwater diversions
increased with crop prices by approximately
4% across the region (Table 4).
Regionally, imposing the policy tax damp-
ened the increase in both per-acre net present
value and water use resulting from the higher
crop prices, but both remained higher than their
untaxed baseline values. As shown in Table 3,
per-acre net present value was 27% larger, with
the tax and higher crop prices than in baseline,
vs. 39% larger with higher prices and no
groundwater tax. Although imposition of the
conservation tax reduced regional groundwater
use by 1.3%, groundwater use remained 2.6%
higher than in the baseline situation and 3.1%
higher than in the baseline with the conserva-
tion tax (Table 4).
Table 3. Percent Change in Total Net Present Value Relative to the Baseline Condition Over the










County $1 Tax Quota Prices Policy Tax Price Policy Tax
Bailey –2.21% –2.21% 0.00% 53.62% 51.49% 114.43% 112.18%
Briscoe* –0.80% –46.06% –26.34% 21.26% –30.67% 36.56% –19.75%
Castro –2.19% –2.19% 0.00% 57.38% 55.17% 117.75% 115.61%
Cochran –0.88% –0.88% 0.00% 24.90% 24.03% 40.89% 40.05%
Crosby –1.89% –1.89% 0.00% 67.15% 65.24% 149.00% 147.07%
Dawson –2.63% –2.56% 0.00% 107.00% 104.29% 169.67% 167.02%
Deaf Smith* –3.64% –31.28% –1.56% 85.73% 55.23% 178.79% 149.46%
Floyd –1.72% –1.73% 0.00% 53.19% 51.52% 117.93% 116.26%
Gaines* –0.81% –50.06% –1.09% 13.63% –36.25% 7.12% –44.34%
Garza –0.66% –0.66% 0.00% 30.43% 29.77% 59.13% 58.42%
Hale –1.47% –1.45% 0.00% 44.11% 42.64% 99.51% 98.09%
Hockley –1.67% –1.67% 0.00% 51.49% 49.82% 98.87% 97.32%
Lamb –1.88% –1.88% 0.00% 62.85% 60.97% 139.85% 138.02%
Lubbock –1.75% –1.75% 0.00% 53.49% 51.79% 113.39% 111.63%
Lynn –0.52% –0.52% 0.00% 25.90% 25.30% 44.70% 44.14%
Parmer –0.84% –0.83% 0.00% 81.93% 78.59% 187.68% 184.44%
Swisher* –0.71% –31.90% –7.56% 27.41% –4.42% 46.40% 15.38%
Terry –0.50% –0.48% 0.00% 15.38% 14.89% 18.77% 18.29%
Yoakum –0.54% –0.54% 0.00% 17.89% 17.38% 24.87% 24.38%
Regional –1.25% –11.75% –1.27% 38.63% 26.69% 75.38% 63.20%
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average crop prices had a marginal effect in
reducing groundwater use relative to their un-
taxed baseline groundwater use level. As ex-
pected, each county used more groundwater
than they did under baseline prices with the
imposition of the conservation tax. As shown in
Table 4, under the historical average price sce-
nario, the conservation tax failed to conserve
50% of initial groundwater supplies in each of
thefourcountieswheretheconservationtaxhad
been raised beyond the current legal maximum
limit of $1 per acre-foot to achieve the 50%
conservation goal. Swisher and Deaf Smith
had 40% and 36%, respectively, of their initial
groundwater reserves at the end of the 50-year
planning horizon with the policy tax imposed.
This suggests that demonstrating that the ef-
fectivenessofanygroundwaterconservationtax
isheavilyinfluencedbymarketpricesforcrops.
How a county adjusts to changes in crop prices
is a function of the economic, agronomic, and
hydrologic parameters governing the individual
county.
Given the agricultural importance of cotton
production to the THP, it was not surprising to
find that over the 50-year simulation, regional
per-acrenetpresentvaluewas75%larger under
the high cotton price scenario relative to the
untaxedhistorical averagepricescenario(Table
3).Inrealterms,a$0.70perpoundlintpricehas
only been exceeded twice in the last 20 years
($0.75 in 1995 and $0.71 in 1984; Texas Ag-
ricultural Statistics Service, 2002), but given
the importance of cottonproduction tothe THP,
this scenario was designed to establish the
likely maximum agricultural use of groundwater
within the THP overthe next50 years. Moreover,
atthecountylevel,per-acrenetpresentvaluewas
larger in all 19 counties modeled relative to the
untaxed historical average price scenario. Eco-
nomic returns in Gaines County were lower be-
cause it specialized in high-valued peanut pro-
duction, and the increase in cotton price was an
insufficientincentivetosubstituteirrigatedcotton
acreage for high-value irrigated peanut acreage.
Regional economic returns were 75% larger than
they were in the baseline and individual county












County $1 Tax Quota Baseline Policy Tax Price Policy Tax
Bailey –0.41% –0.41% 0.00% 1.63% 1.26% 3.32% 2.98%
Briscoe* –0.37% –65.55% –72.06% 1.55% –24.64% 3.03% –20.80%
Castro –2.91% –2.91% 0.00% 2.78% 2.78% 2.72% 2.72%
Cochran –0.02% –0.02% 0.00% –0.18% –0.20% –0.46% –0.49%
Crosby –0.29% –0.29% 0.00% 2.32% 2.06% 4.83% 4.60%
Dawson –0.43% –0.43% 0.00% 1.01% 0.62% 2.10% 1.76%
Deaf Smith* –0.11% –17.94% –15.37% 0.18% –0.71% 0.22% –0.46%
Floyd –0.02% –0.02% 0.00% –0.10% –0.11% –0.28% –0.29%
Gaines* –0.06% –8.83% –6.12% 0.03% –6.72% 2.39% –0.30%
Garza –0.29% –0.29% 0.00% 0.96% 0.70% 2.00% 1.77%
Hale 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –0.01% –0.01% –0.02% –0.02%
Hockley –0.01% –0.01% 0.00% –0.10% –0.11% –0.29% –0.30%
Lamb –0.07% –0.07% 0.00% –0.23% –0.30% –0.60% –0.65%
Lubbock 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% –0.02% –0.03% –0.07% –0.07%
Lynn –0.26% –0.26% 0.00% 0.62% 0.39% 1.28% 1.06%
Parmer –13.41% –13.41% 0.00% 182.22% 182.21% 182.11% 182.11%
Swisher* –0.01% –30.83% –34.31% –0.09% –0.49% –0.27% –0.67%
Terry –0.03% –0.03% 0.00% 0.50% 0.49% 0.45% 0.45%
Yoakum –0.05% –0.05% 0.00% 0.06% 0.01% 0.08% 0.04%
Regional –0.51% –5.66% –4.94% 3.98% 2.62% 4.43% 3.56%
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alowof7%inGainesCountytoahighof187%in
Parmer County (Table 3). As previously noted, at
higher cotton prices, Parmer County reversed its
baselinetrendoftransitioningintodrylandwheat
over time, and Gaines County almost exclusively
stays in irrigated peanut and cotton production.
As shown in Table 4, total regional water use
was approximately 4.4% more than it was under
the 50-year baseline condition and all counties
increased their groundwater use. Overall, rela-
tive to the baseline, individual county ground-
water use increases ranged from a low of 0.3% in
LambCountytoahighof182%inParmerCounty.
The change in the county groundwater use pattern
relative to the baseline condition closely parallels
the distributional pattern of the previously dis-
cussed historical average price scenario.
Despite imposition of the conservation tax,
regional groundwater use was still 3.6% higher
than in the baseline simulation and nearly as
large as it was in the untaxed historical average
price scenario. Moreover, the conservation tax
was an insufficient incentive for four counties
to conserve 50% of initial groundwater reserves.
Groundwater conservation was considerably be-
low the 50% conservation target in each of the
four counties where the tax rate was increased
above the legal $1 per acre-foot maximum value
under baseline conditions. Three of the four
countieshad lessthan40%of theirinitialreserves
at the end of the simulation.
As a result of the significant contribution of
cotton acreage to cropland returns in the THP, it
was not surprising to find that average per-acre
net present values were larger in 17 of the 19
counties relative to the untaxed baseline return.
Only Briscoe and Gaines counties had lower
per-acre net present values than in the untaxed
baseline. This is attributable to the empirical
finding that under baseline conditions, these two
counties found it more profitable to increasingly
specialize in peanut production over time and
limit cotton acreage to a rotational crop. Given
the high value of groundwater in peanut pro-
duction under the baseline condition, these three
counties remained better off paying the additional
tax despite the adverse impact it has on farm
profitability than to significantly reduce ground-
water use and/or increase cotton acreage.
It is interesting to note that under the two
alternate price scenarios considered, the ground-
water use in some counties was actually lower
than under the original baseline. For example, in
Lubbock County, under the historical average
price scenario, the crop mix changed from pro-
ducing more irrigated cotton to producing more
nonirrigated wheat. As a result of this changed
mix, the total groundwater use over the 50-year
planning horizon declined compared with the
original baseline. Similarly, under the higher
cotton price scenario, the crop mix remained the
same for the first 20 years, but as a result of the
higher cotton prices, returns were significantly
higher. Under the higher cotton price scenario,
irrigatedcottoncontinuedtodominateuntilYear
24, i.e. for 4 additional years, resulting in a sig-
nificant increase in the net present value of
returns for the county. Furthermore, it continued
tohavemarginallyhigheracreageuntiltheendof
Year 50 relative to the initial baseline. It was
observed that the higher cotton prices did not
significantly increase cotton farming, although
the economic returns were significantly higher.
Groundwater use was lower by only 0.03%,
which over a 50-year planning horizon may be
very insignificant. In the seven counties that
showed this trend, groundwater use declined
between 0.6% and 0.02% relative to the baseline
(Table 3). Given that the planning horizon com-
prised 50 years, this could be treated as an in-
significant effect.
Acre-Foot Cost of Conserved Water
The conservation policy cost, quantity of water
conserved, and cost per acre-foot of water con-
served by a county and the region for the con-
servation tax policy and for the quota policy are
presented in Table 5. It is important to note that
from a theoretical perspective, both the conser-
vation tax policy and the quota policy should
provide an identical level of conservation. How-
ever, from an empirical perspective, time and
computer resource constraints limited the number
of iterations used to find the conservation tax and
quotalevelforeachcountythatwouldbringabout
convergence. Thus, the values presented are ap-
proximations to the level of water that would be
conservedunderanexacttaxandquota.Although
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2010 706both policies conserve approximately the same
amountofgroundwater,thetotalregionalcostof
the conservation tax policy to production agri-
culture is approximately eight times larger than
for the quota policy. At the regional level, each
acre-foot of groundwater conserved under the
conservationtaxpolicycosts$71comparedwith




The estimated economic cost and attained wa-
ter conservation were significantly different
betweenthepreliminaryfirst-stageandfinalthird-
stage estimates, indicating the importance of
controlling for aquifer heterogeneity in ground-
water policy research. Relative to the baseline
policy,the$1peracre-foottaxpolicydidnotresult
inasignificantlevelofgroundwaterconservation.
Regionally, the policy tax reduced the net present
value of agricultural returns by 19.97% relative to
thebaseline,butonlyconserved2.61%ofregional
groundwater reserves under baseline conditions.
Given the high agricultural cost of the policy tax,
a quota restriction was imposed on groundwater
use in each county to ensure that groundwater
reserves did not decrease below 50% of their ini-
tiallevelineachcountyunderbaselineconditions.
ItwasobservedthatmostcountiesintheTHPwill
economically exhaust the aquifer before physical
depletion occurs. The quota policy reduced re-
gional net income by only 2.29% and conserved
the same quantity of water as the policy tax. Both
the $l tax policy and the quota policy conserve
approximately the same amount of groundwater,
but the total regional cost of the policy tax to
production agriculture is eight times larger than
for the quota policy. The last four scenarios con-
sidered involved two variants of a crop price in-
crease. As expected, groundwater use increased
Table 5. Net Present Value Policy Cost, Conserved Groundwater, and Net Present Value Policy
Cost per Acre-Foot Conserved Water for Baseline Condition: Policy Tax vs. Quota Policy by
County and Region
County
Net Present Value Cost ($) Conserved Water (ac-ft) Cost per ac/ft
Tax Quota Tax Quota Tax Quota
Bailey 4,332,093 0 34,121 0 127 0
Briscoe* 81,460,568 46,577,354 2,426,215 2,666,959 34 17
Castro 7,103,749 0 310,655 0 23 0
Cochran 2,304,419 0 1,503 0 1,533 0
Crosby 4,801,602 0 30,488 0 157 0
Dawson 1,563,536 0 18,400 0 85 0
Deaf Smith* 59,639,834 2,965,923 3,060,206 2,622,398 19 1
Floyd 7,287,302 0 2,259 0 3,226 0
Gaines* 464,089,391 10,084,633 1,695,200 1,174,641 274 9
Garza 352,661 0 2,705 0 130 0
Hale 10,125,838 0 32 0 313,614 0
Hockley 3,654,596 0 583 0 6,266 0
Lamb 7,580,003 0 9,546 0 794 0
Lubbock 4,738,838 0 149 0 31,812 0
Lynn 2,177,910 0 17,281 0 126 0
Parmer 1,624,975 0 492,831 0 3 0
Swisher* 98,226,395 23,262,492 2,622,732 2,918,183 37 8
Terry 3,093,409 0 3,275 0 944 0
Yoakum 2,727,917 0 4,335 0 629 0
Total 766,885,037 82,890,402 10,732,516 9,382,181 71 9
Note: Counties represented by an asterisk required more than a $1 per acre-foot tax to conserve 50% of the aquifers existing
storage at the end of Year 50. Appendix
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ineffective in curbing groundwater use. In fact,
even with imposition of the policy tax, ground-
water use was larger in both price change sce-
narios than in the untaxed baseline condition.
Clearly the effectiveness of any groundwater
conservation tax is heavily influenced by crop
market prices.Howa county adjusts to changesin
croppricesisacomplexfunctionoftheeconomic,
agronomic, and hydrologic parameters governing
the individual county.
Based on the findings of the study, the choice
of whether to implement a tax or quota policy
should ultimately depend on the management
perspective. If one is interested in minimizing
the cost to production agriculture, then the quota
policy is the preferred choice assuming adminis-
tration and enforcement costs are the same under
both policies. However, if administration and en-
forcement cost are high, a management agency
may prefer the tax policy because it generates
revenues that can be used to administer the con-
servation program. Moreover, the conservation
management agency might wish to use any tax
policy revenues generated in excess of their ad-
ministrationcoststopurchasegroundwaterrights.
Irrespective of the type of policy being
studied, the value of the integrated modeling
framework is in its ability to fully combine eco-
nomic factors and physical responses to behav-
iorally driven hydrological stresses. The analytic
frameworkmaintainsspatialvariabilitytocapture
changes in the aquifer’s stored water resources
and water table elevation within the region. It is
also able to account for heterogeneous land use
patterns within a county. Development of such
a policy model possibly enhances the credibility
of economic costs and benefits and water con-
servation estimates developed by policymakers.
It simultaneously considers water conservation
policies at a subregional level. Besides the two
policies examined in this study, other potential
applications for the water policy model could
include investigations into the economic and
hydrologic impact of interbasin water market
transfers, increased irrigation efficiency, and
increased irrigation delivery system efficiency,
all targeting water conservation.
In future research, the availability of more
microlevel data would improve the ability to
accurately perform a detailed county level anal-
ysis. Research of this type will be further en-
hanced by incorporating advanced GIS data col-
lection techniques to gather information on crop
cover, well locations, management techniques,
and crop yields. The activity set of the model can
be increased to consider livestock options, con-
servation reserve program options, and environ-
mental management options such as managing
for the wildlife and water fowl values. Given the
high value of water in the commercial and resi-
dential sectors, the activity set within the model
needstobebroadenedtoconsiderthebenefitsand
costs associated with intersectoral market trans-
fers.Theinitialmodelwouldalsobenefitiftheset
of irrigation technologies included in the model
werebroadened.Moreover,asadditionaldetailed
data are collected, additional agronomic and or
marketing constraints might need to be added to
morefullymodelproducerdecision-making.The
role of crop portfolio management as a producer
risk management tool would also enhance the
model.
[Received November 2009; Accepted June 2010.]
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Appendix
Data Included in the Model
Energy data included an energy use factor for
electricity of 0.164 KWH/feet of lift per acre-inch,
system operating pressure of 16.5 pounds per square
inch, energy price of $0.0633 per KWH, and pump/
engine efficiency of 50%. Other costs included the
initial cost of the irrigation system of $280 per-acre,
annual depreciation percentage of 5%, irrigation
labor of 2 hours per-acre, labor cost of $8/hr, annual
maintenance cost of 8% of initial cost, and a dis-
count rate of 3%.
CROPMAN
CROPMAN is a Windows-based application of
the Environmental/Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC)
model originally developed by USDA-ARS that
simulates the interaction of natural resources (soil,
water, and climate) and crop management practices
on crop yield, soil properties, soil erosion, and nu-
trient/pesticide leaching. CROPMAN requires the
user input data on crops planted, irrigation systems,
soil types, management practices, and weather data.
CROPMAN was used to develop county-specific ir-
rigatedcropproductionfunctionsforthefivedominant
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needed to estimate each county-specific crop water
response function were generated holding the pro-
ductiontechniquesandthetimingofculturalpractices
constant, in each individual county, and allowing only
the quantity of applied irrigation water to vary. Irri-
gation timing was alsoheld constant with the quantity
ofirrigationwaterappliedevenly dividedbetweenthe
variousirrigationdates.Moreover,thesimulatedyield
data were generated under the assumption of average
temperature and average precipitation in the growing
season. The simulated crop yields were recorded for
each water application level and subsequently used to
statistically estimate each county-specific crop yield
response function assuming a quadratic functional
formwithper-acreyieldasthedependentvariableand
the acre-inch quantity of applied irrigation water as
the independent variable. To provide a dryland alter-
native to irrigation, average county-specific dryland
yields were estimated for each crop under average
weather conditions and representative management
techniques.
Weighting Scheme
Stovall (2001) developed the series of weights
used to distribute projected annual aggregate county
groundwater withdrawals over the county aquifer grid
comprising each county. The aquifer grid for most
countiesconsistedofapproximately9001-squaremile
cells.Stovalldevelopedhisweightingschemebyusing
detailed irrigation survey maps provided by High
Plains Underground Water Conservation District #1
andtheSouthPlainsUndergroundWaterConservation
District that inventoried the location of each center
pivotirrigationsysteminusein1999.Foreachcounty,
Stovall overlaid a transparent copy of the aquifer grid
on the irrigation survey maps and counted the number
of irrigation systems located in each grid cell. In a
given county, the percentage of total county ground-
water withdrawn from each cell contained within the
county was calculated as the number of quarter mile
irrigation systems in the grid cell divided by the total
number of irrigation systems within the given county.
By design, the sum of the percentage weights used to
allocatetotalwateramongthegridcellsineachcounty
sum to one.
Social Rate of Time Preference
‘‘The social rate of time preference is the rate at
which society is willing to substitute present for
future consumption of natural resources. The federal
opportunity costof capital and the rate of productivity
growth are commonly used as proxies for the social
rate of time preference. When using the federal cost
of capital, the generally accepted practice is to apply
the effective yield on comparable-term Treasury se-
curities (e.g., 20-year Treasury bonds for a study with
a 20-year analysis timeframe). During the decade of
the1990s,theaverage10-yearTreasurybondratewas
6.01%, whereas inflation averaged 2.88%. Thus, the
real rate of interest on Treasury bonds was roughly
3.13% during the 1990s. Social policy is also con-
cerned with an equitable distribution of consumption
over time. Based on this premise, the rate of pro-
ductivity growth can be used as a proxy for the social
rate of time preference. This policy reflects the op-
portunity cost argument that the incremental or mar-
ginal benefit to the country generated by the public
project should grow as fast as the productive capacity
of industry. From 1990 to 2003, real Gross Domestic
Productgrew by2.96%.Thus,usingproductivityover
that period as the basis of the discount rate generates
a roughly 3.0% rate’’ (National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration, 2010).
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